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It is surprising to write a couple of articles and receive a book in response. Yet such has been 
the flattering reception my own modest contribution to the debate about whether or not 
Kierkegaard should be classed as a ‘narrativist’ in any interesting sense (Lippitt 2005, 2007). 
Both John J. Davenport (the author of the book in question) and Anthony Rudd have in recent 
work sought to clarify the conception of ‘narrative’ that they see as operative in Kierkegaard 
(Davenport 2011, 2012; Rudd 2007b, 2008, 2012). In doing so, both have revised and 
qualified their positions in various respects, enabling them to sidestep some worries that talk 
of ‘narrative’ had sponsored. 1 The gap between Kierkegaardian ‘narrativists’ and 
‘narratosceptics’ has narrowed considerably: the positions of the former now appear to be 
much closer to that which Philip Quinn (2001) and I had advocated in the earlier debate. One 
significant disagreement  remaining, however, concerns the desirability of 
‘wholeheartedness’ as a key dimension of the ‘narrative unity’ on which Davenport insists. 
That will be my concern here.  
                                                 
1 In regard to some of the ‘narratosceptic’ objections outlined in this volume’s introduction, 
see, for instance, Davenport’s distancing from MacIntyre’s use of literary narrative as a guide 
to human life and his explicit recognition of the ‘incompleteness thesis’ about literary 
depictions of lives (2012: 52-9); the revision of talk of one’s ‘whole life’ to mean talk about 
something like the general shape of the most important values in one’s life (more of which 
below); and Rudd’s acknowledgement that the inextricably ethical nature of the ‘narrative 
unity’ with which the Judge confronts A had been downplayed in his earlier work (2012: 




2. Davenport’s new position on narrative unity 
In what he recognises to be a new account of ‘narrative unity’, Davenport outlines five 
different levels thereof, each of which is ‘necessary but not sufficient for the ones after it’ 
(2011: 163). Unity-0 is a pre-reflective recognition of ourselves as the same subject of 
consciousness over time. Unity-1 (the unity of ‘planning agency’) ‘is found in the lives of all 
agents with responsibilities ranging over extended plans’ (2012: 45). In response to an earlier 
objection, Davenport now explicitly agrees that the aesthetes of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, 
such as A and the Seducer, indeed possess both these levels of unity (2012: 47). What they 
lack, he claims, is unity-2: ‘continuity of cares through willed devotion to ends, persons and 
ideals’ (2011: 163; cf. 2012: 47-8). It is commitments involving higher-order volitions (in a 
broadly Frankfurtian sense) which ‘actively sustain the agent’s projects and relationships 
over time’ (ibid.). So while aesthetes possess unity-1, they lack unity-2. As A puts it, ‘No part 
of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he cannot forget it any moment he 
wants to’ (EO I, 293/SKS 2, 282).2 Neither aesthete recognises the existence of any values 
that have normative authority for their cares (2012: 107; cf. Rudd 2008a: 195). Unity-3 
amounts to a version of ‘wholeheartedness’:  
‘(a) The agent is fully dedicated to the goals of each of her cares and (b) has no 
conflicting higher-order volitions; (c) the strong evaluations that ground her different 
cares are not in any essential conflict, and (d) she makes a reasonable effort to balance 
their pursuit and reduce pragmatic conflict between them within a single life, while (e) 
                                                 
2 Davenport quotes this passage in support of his view, but somewhat selectively. A’s 
discussion at this part of ‘Crop Rotation’ is about the inter-relationship of forgetting and 
recollecting. He insists that forgetting is an ‘art’ and that the ability ‘to forget depends upon 
how one remembers’. Immediately after the passage Davenport quotes, A adds ‘on the other 
hand, every single part of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he can 
remember it at any moment’ (ibid.).  
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remaining open to learning new values and accepting criticism of her existing cares.’ 
(2011: 163, my emphases) 
Finally, there is unity-4, a motivating ideal of ‘perfect harmony’ that, in a concession to the 
‘mortality objection’, Davenport admits that we will never achieve (at least this side of death, 
such that here a kind of eschatological faith in post-mortem survival is required). He grants 
that ‘the narrative structure of practical identity is incomplete in the final analysis because it 
points towards an eschatological telos in which we can only have faith’ (2012: 166). This 
introduces the importance of Tolkeinian eucatastrophe, on which Davenport has written 
interestingly elsewhere, and the related importance of hope (Davenport 2008a, 2008b; Lippitt 
2014). 
 
Davenport’s distinction between these levels of narrative unity helps to clarify some key, but 
previously opaque, aspects of the narrative realist case. Elements of his account, such as the 
strikingly realist notion of a narravive (2012: 70-90) will surely prove controversial. But here 
I shall focus on unity-3 (wholeheartedness).  
 
A major issue in this debate has always been how best to describe the kind of shaping of a 
life that virtually all critics recognise to be necessary to some extent. (The disagreement is 
about to what extent.) Recall here Quinn’s objection that too strong a concern with narrative 
unity brings the danger of simplifying by exclusion (both in the proclivity to tell stories about 
our past that are self-deceptive, and to ‘miss the adventure’ in our futures (Lippitt 2007: 52-
58)). Instead, Quinn recommended we ‘welcome plural values into our lives, risking the 
possibility of tragic conflict among them, and ... manage the inevitable tensions as creatively 
and skilfully as we can’ (2001: 333). Davenport’s new version of unity-3 attempts to 
recognise worries about monomania (in d) and ‘missing the adventure’ (in e). He 
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acknowledges that ‘the importance of unity-3 does not imply that we should never risk 
instrumental difficulties due to plural cares;  the value of wholeheartedness for a meaningful 
life only implies that we should not take such risks lightly or unnecessarily’ (2012: 119).3 He 
further acknowledges: ‘There are also unusual circumstances in which the importance of 
openness to different values might itself justify tolerating, for a time, conflict among cares 
that may turn out to be essential conflict’ (ibid.). While maintaining the narrative unity 
terminology, this seems to give Quinn and I pretty much what we asked for.  
 
However,  several questions arise about narrative unity-3. As a preliminary, note that as 
before, this is a very formal, abstract account. What interests me is whether it is adequate to 
address practical issues at the level of the phenomenology of a lived life, and this will only 
emerge at the level of detail. The problem here is that narratosceptic worries about self-
deception re-emerge at this point, as I convince myself that I’ve done enough (made a 
‘reasonable effort’) and listened enough (‘remained open’). As we shall see, perhaps 
Davenport would dismiss these concerns as merely ‘pragmatic’ (2012: 111). However, in 
what follows, I want also to focus on whether Davenport is wise to stick with Frankfurt’s 
‘wholeheartedness’ terminology despite, in other ways, going well beyond his position. 
 
3. Davenport and Frankfurt on wholeheartedness  
Davenport’s account of wholeheartedness differs from Frankfurt’s in several key respects. 
First, Davenport’s commitment to moral realism meansthat for him, the caring central to 
unity-2 depends on what agents take to be objective values, and so unity at this level requires 
coherence amongst these values. Davenport is now clearer that he intends ‘wholeheartedness’ 
                                                 
3 Though how clear is it what this claim amounts to, given legitimate disagreements as to 
what constitutes a reasonable appetite for risk?  
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(unity-3) as a regulative good, so the relations (and potential conflicts) between an agent’s 
central cares are crucial. He distinguishes between two varieties of such conflict: 
‘instrumental’ and ‘essential’ (2012: 111). The former – such as where two ends compete for 
limited resources of time or energy – simply requires ‘pragmatic’ resolution, and he denies 
that a narrative realist owes us an account of how diverse interests and values are supposed to 
be reconciled with the need for focus that arises from our finitude. ‘Essential’ conflict 
involves inconsistent strong evaluations (in Charles Taylor’s sense) of our goals and pursuits 
(2012: 109). Davenport acknowledges that this may not be obvious in advance: ‘Sometimes it 
is only through caring that we can understand well enough the values involved in what we 
care about to recognize subtle ways in which they are opposed’ (2012: 111). Note, therefore, 
that there is a pragmatic problem for even ‘essential’ conflict, which is what my earlier 
question - ‘how do we decide, in the case of all but the most obviously incompatible ends, 
whether they are harmonious or not?’ (2005: 75) – was an attempt to get at.  
 
Davenport develops as follows his account of how we need to go beyond Frankfurt. His own 
account of wholehearted caring involves both negative and positive conditions. The negative 
condition is that we need to avoid essential conflict between our higher order volitions and 
between our specific cares. (As noted above, this is easier specified than achieved.) The 
positive condition is that we should take sufficient account of what values are worth caring 
about in our specific circumstances, and should also devote serious attention to each care 
(2012: 112). This again acknowledges the narratosceptic worry that one might otherwise get 
wholeheartedness ‘on the cheap’ through lack of imagination or monomania. Thus 
wholeheartedness as Davenport conceives it plays a regulative role: ‘Instead of teleological 
unification under a single finite goal, wholeheartedness is normally realized in the practical 
harmony between the main themes of our life established by our primary cares’ (2012: 115; 
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cf. Rudd 2007: 545). What he calls the regulative thesis about unity-3 can be stated as does 
Rudd (whom Davenport cites):   
‘In aiming, as I do, at various distinct goals, I have to take into account that these are all 
things that I am trying to achieve, and that how I set about one project will inevitably 
be affected by how I set about others. A typical life narrative will not be a story of the 
pursuit of one single goal, but the story of how the protagonist attempts (successfully or 
not) to coordinate his/her different projects and goals with one another. So an agent 
who is committed to making space in his or her life for Work, Family, Leisure, 
Creativity etc. will do so on the basis of considering them all as valuable aspects of the 
one life that he or she has to lead, and will therefore have to be concerned with how 
they all fit together.’ (2009: 64-5)4  
                                                 
4 At this level, I have no quarrel. But there is room for significant misunderstanding here. In 
an immediately following footnote, Rudd alleges that I previously claimed that the need to 
manage one’s time gives only an ‘utterly trivial sense’ to the idea of a unified life. Instead, he 
points out that our finitude and temporality mean we are faced with various tough choices in 
attempting to marry the demands of work, family life, etc. (2009: 73). In fact, I have no 
problem with such an uncontroversial claim. Far from denying that we need to weigh up such 
goods, I explicitly said, in my discussion of John Christman, that ‘Christman’s point here, I 
take it, is not that I do not need to decide how to balance the demands of work and family 
commitments, for example, in my life’ (2007: 46). There has never been a disagreement 
between Davenport, Rudd and myself on the importance of such reflection. Rather, I took 
Christman’s point to be ‘that I should not necessarily feel any obligation to bring each and 
every aspect of my life under one grand narrative. For example, my life is ethically none the 
worse for the fact that I have given little if any thought to the question of how to “unify” my 
life qua gardener with my life qua soccer fan. (Except in the utterly trivial sense that I can’t 
tend the roses while at the game.) Yet any account of my “whole life”  - unless that phrase 
turns out to mean vastly less than it promises – will have to take such factors into account’ 
(2007: 46-7, first emphasis added). It is only in the above parenthesis that I used the phrase 
‘utterly trivial’. It is now clearer that for both Rudd and Davenport, what my ‘whole life’ 
actually means is something like ‘those aspects of my life which constitute goods between 
which I have to find a sensible balance if my life is to constitute living in the light of, and 
“for”, the good’. Fine: but then can we not find a less misleading phrase? My explicit point 
was precisely about the unclarity of what talk of one’s ‘whole life’ amounts to (2007: 47). 
Such an over-egged phrase threatens to obscure what is valuable about this evaluative, 
reflective retrospective and planning dimension of practical reason. In this sense, the 
proffered meaning does indeed turn out to offer less than it promises. Charles Taylor’s talk of 




Rudd is right to say that finding a balance between work and family life is ‘an absolutely 
central issue in the lives of very many people’ (2009: 65). But when he adds that ‘to brush it 
aside with the comment that these are just two distinct “sequences of a person’s life [which] 
proceed quite independently of each other” would be absurd’ (ibid.), he attacks a straw man, 
since neither I nor Christman (as I interpreted him) is saying this. Rudd acknowledges in a 
further footnote that he is unsure whether Christman means to say this about  
 
‘tension between such major commitments as family and career. But if he wouldn’t, 
that would seem to leave his comment about the separateness of our narratives applying 
only to minor and trivial concerns. This is more or less analytic; a concern would be 
minor and trivial for X by definition if X didn’t care enough about it to worry about 
how to balance it with other perceived goods in his/her life. Anything that we find 
important enough to care about is something that we have to balance with other goods 
in thinking about how to live our lives.’ (2009: 73; cf. 2012: 187-8)  
 
Slight ambiguities about the meaning of ‘care’ aside, I think Rudd here agrees with what was 
my point: that the kind of evaluative, backward-looking reflection and forward-looking 
planning that matters in human lives does not need to be extended to one’s ‘whole life’ in any 
literal sense. I can engage in this important aspect of practical reasoning without needing to 
work out in advance, or give a precise weighting to, how much time I spend in the garden as 
opposed to watching football. I think Davenport, too, acknowledges this when he says that 
‘the synchronic dimension of essential coherence among our identity-constituting cares is 
compatible with a certain amount of diachronic disunity in our instrumental planning and 
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follow-through’ (2012: 113).5  Insofar as they both more explicitly acknowledge the 
importance of welcoming a plurality of goods into our lives (Rudd 2012: 215-7), and that a 
degree of ‘existential risk’ is necessary and desirable in the well-lived life, the gap between 
Davenport and Rudd, and Quinn and myself, on this point now seems negligible. 
 
In this context, Davenport replies to narratosceptic worries about self-deception by stressing 
that authentic caring requires honesty with oneself, and a ‘rational commitment to avoid self-
deceptive stories about one’s practical identity’ (2012: 117), since without this, one is 
pragmatically inconsistent – and such a self-conception ‘is liable to collapse rapidly under 
any significant pressure from external reality’ (2012: 118). Though again, he concedes that 
‘maybe no one avoids …. completely’ (ibid.) self-deceptive illusions about their motives. 
 
4. Beyond wholeheartedness: lessons from the Rat Man 
Notwithstanding the differences between Frankfurt and Davenport sketched above, I would 
argue that any account derived from Frankfurtian wholeheartedness would do well to take on 
board David Velleman’s critique thereof. This highlights the need for a richer terminological 
landscape than Frankfurt offers us (and to which Davenport still seems committed). At the 
very least, we need to make space for a kind of ‘wholeheartedness’ that includes attitudes 
more naturally described as ambivalence, and the oddness of such a description shows the 
need to get beyond this terminology. I’ll try to make this case by connecting Velleman’s 
discussion of Freud’s ‘Rat Man’ with some recent discussions of forgiveness.  
 
                                                 
5 That said, Davenport’s important warning (2012: 120) about not confusing Quinn’s 
valorisation of listening to plural internal ‘voices’ with the rationalising of insincerity that C. 
S. Lewis warns against in The Screwtape Letters is well-taken. 
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The Rat Man is the chief protagonist of one of Freud’s most fascinating case histories. The 
main features of his disorder ‘were fears that something might happen to two people of 
whom he was very fond – his father and a young lady whom he admired’ (1955: 158). Early 
in his treatment he reported to Freud a conversation with a sadistic army colleague about a 
horrific punishment in which a pot of rats was placed on the victim’s buttocks and allowed to 
bore their way into his anus. When told of this, Freud’s patient instantly formed the idea 
(interpreted by Freud as a repressed wish) ‘that this was happening to a person who was very 
dear’ to him (1955: 167). In fact, two such people: the young woman and - it later emerged - 
his father.  
 
Freud’s diagnosis of the Rat Man’s problem is a ‘splitting of the personality’ resulting from 
‘a battle between love and hate raging in [his] breast’ (1955: 191) with respect to both his 
father and the woman. He both loved and hated them, but rather than experience these 
emotions as mixed, he repressed the hatred, dividing himself into both consciously loving and 
unconsciously hating selves. This, for Freud, explains his symptoms, such as his repeatedly 
doing and undoing an action (such as the removal and subsequent replacement of a stone 
from a road down which the woman’s carriage would travel (1955: 190)). Velleman suggests 
that although it looks at first as if ambivalence is the problem, a closer look reveals that the 
problem was ‘not so much ambivalence as his response to it’; that is, ‘by repressing his 
hatred and acknowledging only his love’ (2006: 343).  
 
What matters for our purposes is that ‘The Rat Man’s repression ... consisted in a concerted 
practice of self-misinterpretation’ (ibid.) For instance, euphemistically describing his regular 
thoughts of harm befalling his father as mere ‘trains of thought’ (1955: 178) rather than 
hostile wishes, or displacing his hostile feelings towards his father on to himself or his 
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analyst. This misinterpretation is motivated by ‘the desire to dissociate himself from his own 
hatred and hostility’ (2006: 344).  
 
Velleman claims that the Rat Man suffered ‘not from the disease of ambivalence but from 
something like Frankfurt’s cure. What made him ill was his effort to dissociate himself from 
one of his emotions, which is just what Frankfurt prescribes for cases of ambivalence’ (ibid., 
my emphasis). In his reply, Frankfurt denies this, claiming that the Rat Man’s problem is that 
‘he became ill because he tried to achieve dissociation through repression’ (2002: 126), and 
that Frankfurt’s own prescription – ‘taking a decisive stand against certain feelings’ (ibid.) - 
is wholly different. Frankfurt insists that ambivalence as he uses the term involves not just 
mixed feelings but a divided will. The Rat Man should have resolved which side he is on: 
‘come to stand decisively against the hatred and behind the love’ (ibid.)6  
 
But is there really so great a difference here? Velleman explicitly acknowledged that for 
Frankfurt a person can be wholehearted while retaining conflicting desires, so long as he has 
decisively identified with one and dissociated himself from the other. Yet he also notes just 
how strongly Frankfurt expresses this: the process of becoming wholehearted ‘involves a 
radical separation of the competing desires, one of which is not merely assigned a relatively 
less favoured position but extruded entirely as an outlaw’ (1988: 170). Such phraseology 
makes it difficult to see the difference between Frankfurt’s recommendation and repression.  
 
                                                 
6 Relatedly, Frankfurt claims elsewhere: ‘Wholeheartedness does not require that a person be 
altogether untroubled by inner opposition to his will. It just requires that, with respect to any 
such conflict, he himself be fully resolved ... he must be resolutely on the side of one of the 
forces struggling within him and not on the side of any other’ (1999: 100). 
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A full justification of this claim would take us too far into Freudian territory: is Frankfurtian 
expulsion from the self ‘the ultimate aim of repression’ (2006: 345n48)? But Velleman’s 
commonsensical story alone convinces me that the distinction between wholeheartedness and 
repression is far less clear than Frankfurt would have us believe. Velleman makes three 
important claims. First, that people typically have feelings of love for their parents mixed 
with feelings of, if not hatred, then residual hostility. Second, a piece of folk wisdom about 
dealing with mixed emotions: when angry with someone we love, ‘the first step towards 
dealing with our anger is to let it mingle with, and be modified by, our other emotions toward 
the same person. Isolating our hostility from our other feelings is a way of not dealing with it, 
of allowing it to remain undigested, a lasting source of inner strife and outer impulsiveness’ 
(2006: 346, my emphasis). Yet – third – it is so daunting to allow these emotions to mingle 
with each other that we often seek alternative strategies:  
‘The Rat Man chose to regard his hatred as foreign because he was afraid of letting it 
into his emotional life, even though doing so was his only chance of domesticating it. 
All of us are like the Rat Man at least to this extent, that we feel threatened by various 
emotions that would introduce conflict into our lives. We consequently wish that our 
commitments were not tinged with regret, that our projects were not fraught with 
doubts, that our loves were not complicated by hate. We wish ... we could be 
wholehearted.’ (ibid., my emphasis) 
But Velleman doubts this wish is ‘healthy’, insofar as we may simply be aiming to defend 
ourselves against our own emotions: ‘Hence our affinity for Frankfurt’s ideal may not 
indicate that he’s right about the constitution of the self; it may indicate no more than our 
own defensiveness’ (ibid.) Sympathetic to this, I stick with my earlier view that the kind of 
willingness to live with a degree of paradox can be a better option. This dovetails with Marya 
Schechtman’s objection – which I still endorse – that ‘the work of shaping a life is less of a 
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task of micro-management’ than Frankfurt implies, and that it is ‘less about directly settling 
conflicts than about establishing safe boundaries within which these conflicts can be allowed 
to play themselves out’ (2004: 426). I’m not sure whether, in his new position, Davenport 
agrees with this or not. But as regards Kierkegaard, it seems clear that a willingness to live 
with a degree of paradox and creative tension has at least as much claim to be considered 
‘Kierkegaardian’ as does a picture that places perhaps too great a reliance on Purity of Heart. 
Though in fact, I shall suggest later how the Rat Man can actually pass the ‘purity of heart’ 
test. 
 
In his discussion of proper self-love in The Reasons of Love, Frankfurt again insists that the 
ambivalent person cannot decide ‘once and for all’ which side of his competing desires he is 
on, and so remains ‘volitionally fragmented’ (2004: 92). This ambivalence allegedly thwarts 
proper self-love, since there is ‘no final unequivocal truth, no straightforward fact of the 
matter’ (2004: 93) concerning whether or not, say, Søren really loves Regine. Consequently, 
Søren ‘is as radically ambivalent concerning himself in this matter as he is concerning her’ 
(ibid.) But Frankfurt’s insistence on a ‘once and for all’ decision seems untrue to the 
complexity of matters of love – and life.7 And it’s curiously at odds with a footnote in which 
he seems to recognise a version of this worry. Frankfurt says: ‘being wholehearted does not 
entail having a closed mind. The wholehearted person need not be a fanatic. Someone who 
knows without qualification where he stands may nonetheless be quite ready to give serious 
attention to reasons for changing that stand. There is a difference between being confident 
and being stubborn or obtuse’ (2004: 95). While a welcome recognition of the complexity of 
life, this leaves plenty unclear. What, if anything, would lead someone from giving the 
                                                 
7 This ‘once and for all’ stipulation is precisely what sponsored the ‘moral blindness’ worry I 
raised in Lippitt 2007. 
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alternative stance ‘serious attention’ to actually changing his mind? Would such a person still 
count as ‘wholehearted’? If so, what would justify that description? For if he does change his 
stance, then clearly his decision wasn’t ‘once and for all’. 
 
Interestingly, Rudd seems some distance from Frankfurt on this point. First, in a response to 
Nussbaum’s claim that the ethical life requires flexibility and openness to unimagined 
possibilities (part of the ‘moral blindness’ worry), Rudd agrees, responding that it is a 
common mistake ‘to think that narrative theories require us to map out a detailed plot for our 
lives in advance and then grimly stick to that, forcing whatever events happen to occur into 
that pre-conceived framework. On the contrary, in narrating our own lives, we are making up 
our stories as we go along, weaving the contingencies of life into a design that keeps 
changing in previously unpredictable ways as we do so’ (2012: 217). So much the better for 
narrative theories. But we are some considerable distance here from Frankfurt’s ‘once and for 
all’ stipulation. What Rudd is saying is that we should resist ‘wholeheartedness’ thus 
understood.   
 
Indeed, in his final chapter, Rudd gives an account that I think amounts to what a narrativist 
should say on this point. At the outset, Rudd acknowledges the self-deception objection: that 
any ‘realistic’ account of the self and its orientation to the Good (the main theme of his book) 
must ‘take account of our tendencies to self-deception and fantasy, our pervasive failures of 
self-knowledge’(2012: 228). For this reason, he goes on to explore the importance of the 
unconscious for the project of balancing ‘self-shaping’ with ‘self-acceptance’. One kind of 
‘bad’ story one might tell about oneself - and thus on Rudd’s account a ‘failure of self-
knowledge’ - is one where although none of the facts are falsified, the story ‘fail[s] to make 
the connections that would make true sense of one’s life; and may instead make connections 
14 
 
that obscure that sense’ (2012: 232). This, I suggest, serves as a good description of the Rat 
Man, or anyone who, faced with two conflicting feelings both of which are significant for 
self-understanding, takes Frankfurt’s advice and identifies with one feeling, ‘extruding as an 
outlaw’ the other. Such a person is precisely failing to make connections that would make 
‘true sense’ of his life. Rudd is rightly troubled by accounts of the unconscious wherein the 
purpose of psychotherapy is simply to bring to the surface repressed feelings so that, aware of 
them, we might better control them. This ‘makes it sound as though one’s unconscious is an 
alien being dragging one around despite oneself’: a ‘dangerous misunderstanding’ (2012: 
236). Rather, inspired by Jung, Rudd suggests that instead of identifying myself with a 
conscious ego, ‘the ego needs to learn from the unconscious, not just about it’; or ‘the ego 
may need to let itself be shaped by the unconscious, rather than just learning how to shape it’ 
(2012: 239). Frankfurt’s advice to stand ‘decisively against the hatred and behind the love’ is 
prone to the charge that the I with which such a person identifies is ‘stunted’ and needs ‘to 
grow and change, by opening itself up to what it had deformed by excluding’ (2012: 236).8  
 
Rudd’s discussion of Schechtman’s example of the Fifties Wife - whose higher order will 
identifies with her role as housewife and mother, but who is haunted by her repressed desires 
for higher education and career - offers an interesting parallel to the Rat Man. I find Rudd’s 
advice greatly superior to Frankfurt’s. If the Fifties Wife finds herself haunted by fantasies of 
setting fire to the house, poisoning her husband’s food or thrashing the children, the point ‘is 
not that she should act on these fantasies, but that she should take them seriously as 
symptoms, see them as telling her that she is experiencing her life as intolerably narrow and 
oppressive’ (2012: 247). What she should do about it is a matter for ‘conscious and self-
                                                 
8 Compare here Rudd’s criticism of Freud’s remarks on Goethe’s Faust: Frankfurt’s advice 
looks to me like another instance of ‘the hubristic ego, attempting to impose its own narrow 
vision of order on what it may too quickly dismiss as mere chaos’ (2012: 238).  
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critical exploration’, not simply a matter of standing firm in favour of her higher order 
commitments. She needs somehow to ‘take in what she has repressed, though in a form 
which enables it to be integrated with a less one-sided version of what she finds of real value 
in her family life’ (ibid.). This is a good example of what Rudd describes as ‘the need for a 
delicate balance between the need to recognise and accept our natures as having their own 
stubborn realities; and the need to take active responsibility for their shaping’ (2012: 244). 
Similarly, imagine a version of the Rat Man whose aggressive fantasies against his father are 
a frustrated way of expressing his unconscious resentment of his father’s controlling nature. 
The challenge for him is how to recognise this honestly; take it up into his sense of self; and 
work to recognise what in these feelings of hatred is good (the desire for greater 
independence of his father?). In such a case, we could agree with Rudd’s verdict on the 
Fifties Wife: that the basic reason why she should integrate her conflicting desires is ‘not just 
that she will feel unhappy if she doesn’t, but that she will be leading an objectively worse life 
if she fails to do so’ (2012: 248).  
 
Perhaps a defender of ‘wholeheartedness’ might insist that there is still a sense here in which 
something with that name can play a role as a regulative ideal. But insofar as this is true, we 
have gone so far beyond Frankfurt’s use of the term, that I can see no real merit in retaining 
it.9 Moreover, I believe that the proper role of successful psychotherapy here is to lead a 
person from feeling unmanageably torn to feeling manageably torn: still, perhaps, a kind of 
‘ambivalence’. I wonder whether Rudd’s greater openness to psychoanalytic insights might 
partially explain why ‘wholeheartedness’ appears nowhere in his index, whereas it still plays 
                                                 
9 Rudd certainly sees Jungian integration as an important complement to the ethical 
understanding of the self he seeks to develop, and views this integration as an ethical or 
evaluative goal (2012: 245). But for the reasons sketched above, I think it would be 
misleading to describe such integration as a quest for Frankfurt-inspired ‘wholeheartedness’. 
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a central role in Davenport’s account.10 If Davenport agrees with the views I have drawn on 
Rudd to express above, I suggest that he would be better off abandoning the term.  
 
Earlier I suggested that the ‘Kierkegaardian’ accounts that Davenport and Rudd have each 
offered may be putting too great an emphasis on Purity of Heart.11 Without resiling from that 
view, I want now to suggest that even if one did make the concerns of that discourse central, 
the Freud-Velleman advice to the Rat Man (as opposed to Frankfurt’s) can still be judged as 
‘willing the good in truth’. Note that this parallels Velleman’s claim that while at first it looks 
as if the Rat Man’s problem is ambivalence, the problem is in fact his response to it. Fully 
acknowledging his feelings as a mixture of love and hatred (and working through them – but 
without prejudging the destination of that process) at first looks like ambivalence, but in fact 
amounts to ‘willing the good in truth’. It is crucial to see that such an attitude to his mixed 
feelings is not an instance of the ‘doublemindedness’ Kierkegaard condemns. The Rat Man 
would not be ‘will[ing] the good only to a certain degree’ (UDVS, 64/SKS 8, 172).12 On the 
contrary, the Rat Man who moves from being unmanageably to manageably torn between his 
mixed feelings can be said to be fully ‘willing the good in truth’. Recognising his 
ambivalence towards his father cannot accurately be described as willing the good partially 
along with something else, as it is not a question of ‘love good; hate bad’. Rather, he is 
relating to the situation truthfully. By contrast, failing to address his mixed feelings in this 
                                                 
10 Rudd does mention ‘wholeheartedness’ en passant (2012: 46, 105), but it is not a central 
element of his account.  
11 I do not have space to explore this here, but in judging what is ‘Kierkegaardian’, suppose 
instead we took our measure from Kierkegaard’s three late discourses on the lily and the bird 
(WA, 1-45/SKS, 11 7-48). What is commended there – to take joy in ‘today’ and to view as 
irrelevant ‘tomorrow’ or ‘the day after tomorrow’ (WA, 38/SKS 11, 42) – seems to leave 
little room for a focus on narrative unity.  
12 I take it that this is the only kind of doublemindedness discussed by Kierkegaard of which 
the Rat Man could plausibly be accused. He is clearly not willing the good for the sake of 
reward (UDVS, 37ff./SKS 8, 149ff.), out of fear of punishment (UDVS, 44ff./SKS 8, 156ff.) 
or out of self-wilfulness (UDVS, 60ff./SKS 8, 169ff.).  
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way would be a version of the ‘evasion’ that Kierkegaard condemns (UDVS, 82/SKS 8, 188). 
Just willing the love, while excluding (repressing?) the hate, would not be ‘willing the good 
in truth’.  
 
In light of all this, I still think that ‘wholeheartedness’, even as a regulative ideal, is a term 
apt to mislead. In further support of this, I want now to turn to a brief discussion of the 
capacity for forgiveness, a central theme in Kierkegaard’s thought (see Lippitt 2013a: 156-
180). I shall argue that the grammar of forgiveness raises further doubts about 
‘wholeheartedness’.  
 
In Frankfurt’s classic example of drug addiction, the addict who is trying to kick the habit can 
label the competing desire as an ‘it’, ‘the addiction’, alien from himself.13 But in the case of 
forgiveness, the recommended radicality – ‘extruding as an outlaw’ – is just as inappropriate 
as in the Rat Man case. I’ll argue that built into the very nature of an important variety of 
forgiveness – both of others and oneself – is an important attitude that a ‘wholeheartedness’ 
account cannot readily accommodate.  
 
5. Beyond wholeheartedness: lessons from forgiveness and self-forgiveness 
Consider first the case of forgiveness of others. Christopher Bennett has distinguished 
between two metaphors for forgiveness: ‘wiping the slate clean’ and ‘turning the other 
cheek’. As well as ‘redemptive’ forgiveness - which can be warranted by a wrongdoer doing 
enough (through apology; contrition; making amends) to ‘wipe the slate clean’ - Bennett 
points to ‘personal’ forgiveness which depends more upon forgiver than wrongdoer. This can 
be granted without the wrongdoer’s prior repentance, sometimes in the hope of inspiring it. 
                                                 
13 In some psychotherapeutic addiction treatments, clients are explicitly encouraged to do so. 
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Such ‘turning the other cheek’ ‘involves having sufficient [moral] confidence in your own 
status ... that you are prepared to make yourself vulnerable to further insult in order to reach 
out to the wrongdoer in some way – for instance in the hope of encouraging his return to the 
moral community’ (2003: 139). But such forgiveness does not imply that the slate has been 
‘wiped clean’, and can be offered in such a manner as ‘to make it clear that I do not regard 
[the wrongdoer] as vindicated or excused’: the relationship re-established is ‘tentative’, even 
‘mistrustful’ (2003: 141). (Consider the case of forgiving a spouse their adultery.) The 
important point is that there can be a kind of forgiveness that continues to incorporate blame. 
It is possible to ‘put the wrong behind you’ without accepting that the slate has been wiped 
clean, as if the wrong had never occurred. We need such a conception of forgiveness to 
address the valid concern that it is possible to forgive too easily. (The endlessly betrayed 
spouse who always readily forgives their partner’s adultery strikes us as lacking proper self-
respect.)  
 
The wholeheartedness/ambivalence distinction will not do justice to such cases. If forced to 
describe such a situation using one of these terms, ambivalence would be the better option, as 
these will be cases about which we are likely to have recurrent doubts.  
 
An analogous situation holds in the case of self-forgiveness. Akin to Bennett’s forgiveness 
that retains blame, Robin Dillon has independently argued that we need to allow for a kind of 
self-forgiveness that retains room for continuing self-reproach. Here we need to hold together 
two thoughts. The first is the undesirability of constant self-laceration for the sake of it. Yet 
the second is that, just as we worry about the lack of self-respect of the person who 
repeatedly grants forgiveness too easily, so are we even more suspicious of the person who 
forgives himself with excessive ease. Such letting myself off the moral hook is not just 
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weakness of will, but a violation of moral integrity. As Dillon argues, self-condemnatory 
attitudes ‘express one’s judgement, in light of standards that are important to one’s moral 
self-identity, that some central aspect of oneself is reprehensible’. One cannot overcome 
those attitudes without renouncing the judgment and the standards on which they are based. 
And ‘when those standards are central to one’s normative self-identity ... renouncing them 
would be a failure to respect oneself and a sacrifice of moral integrity, which would give one 
additional grounds for self-condemnation’ (2001: 57-8).  
 
Yet Dillon argues that holding ‘a complex view of oneself that is shot through with 
ambivalence’ is perfectly consistent with forgiving oneself. This is because:  
‘Self‐forgiveness does not require extinguishing all self‐reproach, for it is not really 
about the presence or absence of negative feelings and judgments; it’s about their 
power. Forgiving oneself means not that one no longer experiences self‐reproach but 
that one is no longer in bondage to it, no longer controlled or crippled by a negative 
conception of oneself and the debilitating pain of it, no longer alienated from oneself, 
so that one can now live well enough. This is possible even if one retains a measure of 
clear‐sighted self‐reproach, overcoming it without eliminating it.’ (2001: 83, my 
emphases)14 
 
This parallels Velleman’s recommendation to the Rat Man. Frankfurt’s reply would probably 
be that this is not enough to count as ambivalent in his sense: our self-forgiver’s will would 
have to be divided, and provided he has resolved ‘once and for all’ to forgive himself, then he 
counts as wholehearted. But what sense can be made of such a ‘once and for all’ resolution in 
                                                 
14 I have argued that a closely related view can be found in Kierkegaard (Lippitt 2013).  
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a concrete case like this? For those doubts that I will feel, in any actual such case of self-
forgiveness conceived as a difficult moral task, are in significant part doubts about whether 
my (higher order) will to forgive myself is warranted. Thus the options seem to be, first, a 
case where my iron will to forgive myself comes down ruthlessly on any moments of self-
doubt, which are judged as weaknesses, and ‘extruded as outlaws’. Or, second, where the will 
is in some sense divided (that is, where I sometimes doubt my higher order resolution to 
forgive myself). The latter sounds truer to genuine cases of self-forgiveness as a moral task. 
But such an internally torn will does not have to be debilitating. Dillon’s description is apt: ‘it 
is not really about the presence or absence of negative feelings and judgments; it’s about their 
power’. The first option – the iron will trampling self-doubt - sounds like the attitude that was 
so damaging to the Rat Man. In short, what I am claiming is that ‘wholeheartedness’ is quite 
the wrong term to describe the ‘managably torn’ nature most of us feel in such cases of 
forgiveness and self-forgiveness. ‘Ambivalent’ would be a better term (presumably why 
Dillon - like Freud’s translator before her (1955: 239) - picks it). The point is that in such 
cases – unlike that of Frankfurt’s addict - in forgiving myself, I must continue to view that 
‘inner opposition to the will’ – to continue to blame myself - as mine, as part of me.15 If I 
don’t, then for Dillon’s reasons, I let myself down qua moral agent.  
 
This leaves Davenport with the following question. Is there room for this kind of 
ambivalence within his new variety of wholeheartedness? Some of his account suggests so.16 
But then doesn’t this suggest that the descriptors simply can’t do justice to the complexity of 
the landscape, and that what we need is a richer terminological toolkit? The real task, I 
                                                 
15 This is not at all the same thing as ‘only partially repent[ing] of some error’ (Davenport 
2012: 112). I trust I have said enough above to show why being manageably torn should not 
be conflated with being ‘halfhearted’ or ‘doubleminded’ in an ethically culpable sense.  
16 See especially his recognition of the importance of ‘infinite resignation’ (2012: 145-9).  
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suspect, is to work out what forms of ambivalence really are a threat to our ‘existential 
coherence’, and which we need actively to embrace.  
 
6. Goldie on self-forgiveness 
In his recent, posthumously published book, the leading narrativist Peter Goldie has explicitly 
discussed self-forgiveness, arguing that a narrative sense of self is precisely what we need to 
understand why self-forgiveness is valuable. I have no problem with much of what Goldie 
has to say about ‘the narrative sense of self’,17 but though his discussion of self-forgiveness is 
illuminating, it is interesting that he elides precisely the problem I drew upon Velleman and 
Dillon above to highlight.  
 
For Goldie, self-forgiveness is one way in which we apply ‘narrative thinking’ about our 
future (such as ‘planning, forming policies, and making resolutions’ (2012: x).) Goldie’s 
discussion of self-forgiveness is strongly influenced by Charles Griswold, who holds that 
self-forgiveness is possible, but that it falls short of paradigmatic forgiveness (2007: 113). 
For Goldie, the central difficulty that self-forgiveness faces is that paradigmatic forgiveness 
is dyadic; a moral relation between two people. He argues that the solution to this difficulty 
‘lies in the narrative sense of self, and in the way in which one can think of oneself as 
another’ (2012: 102). Narrative thinking about my past is dyadic in the sense that it involves 
me now thinking about me then (2012: 106).18 Looking back on an occasion in which I have 
made a cruel joke behind a friend’s back (Goldie’s example), me now views myself as a 
                                                 
17 Goldie distinguishes between a ‘narrative sense of self’ and a ‘sense of a narrative self’ 
(2012: x, 117-149), arguing that there is no interesting form of the latter. In this sense, his 
position – metaphysically neutral about personal identity (2012: 125-7) - is distinct from 
Schechtman (whom he explicitly criticises), Davenport and Rudd.  
18 Not that this means there are literally two people: self-forgiveness would be impossible 
were me now not the same person as me then. 
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character in a narrative, in which I now judge as boastful and disloyal what struck me then as 
witty and sophisticated. As a result of this, I experience remorse. In such a circumstance, the 
first four of Griswold’s conditions for forgiveness are met: we have an offence against 
another for which I judge myself responsible; reactive (negative) emotions thereto; a 
narrative account of what I did, and why, which makes my actions intelligible; and contrition 
for the wrong. When we turn from thinking about the past to thinking about the future, Goldie 
argues, we see that the fifth condition is also met: commitment for change (and taking serious 
steps to live up to this commitment). Thus:  
‘Engaging in narrative thinking of myself in the future, imagining myself acting on the 
self-governing policies that I have now adopted because of my regrets for what I did in 
the past, I can now conceive of myself in future episodes, acting as I now know I 
should. And I now feel, external to the narrative, emotions that express my satisfaction, 
through strong reflective endorsement, with my self-governing policies. In the long run, 
my aim is that these policies will become embedded in my character and personality 
traits, so that the policies no longer need to be conscious, explicit parts of my self-
governance. By then my commitment for change will have been fully met’ (2012: 108).  
At this point, all the conditions allowing self-forgiveness are in place. I may continue to have 
reactive negative emotions when I recall my misdeed, ‘but meeting the conditions of self-
forgiveness means that one need no longer have continuing reactive attitudes towards one’s 
continuing self, such as shame, self-contempt and self-loathing’ (ibid.) 
Our earlier discussion has put us in a position to see what is right, and what potentially 
problematic, in this description. Prima facie, what Goldie is commending sounds consistent 
with wholeheartedness. But what is the status of the continuing reactive attitudes towards 
oneself? Goldie is right that we don’t want a debilitating remorse or self-reproach. This 
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undesirable result is perhaps most likely brought about by an attitude of globalised self-
condemnation (‘I’m vicious, good-for-nothing scum!’). But as Goldie also acknowledges, it 
does not follow from this that there is no room for me now to continue to see me then as 
blameworthy, and to experience the appropriate emotions about this. And the fact that me 
now and me then are the same person makes this something other than third person 
observation: it makes all of shame, remorse - and self-forgiveness - both possible and (in the 
right circumstances) appropriate.   
But Goldie’s account will be incomplete unless we add to it our important earlier emphasis: 
that me now’s continuing to blame me then is an important dimension of responsible self-
forgiveness. Goldie’s way of putting this risks making it sound as if my continued negative 
emotions when I recall my misdeed are a regrettable remnant of reflection on the past that I 
haven’t – yet – quite been able to shake off (2012: 147). (Recall Rudd’s criticism of Freud on 
a related point.) But in fact, such a reaction – of continued ‘ambivalence’? – is a crucial part 
of what distinguishes responsible from irresponsible self-forgiveness.  
And finally, note that this ‘pro-ambivalence’ view appears to be Kierkegaard’s. The 
importance of self-forgiveness to which Kierkegaard is fervently committed is no easy matter 
in which the slate is wiped clean as if no wrong had been committed. In precisely the 
discourse on which Davenport and Rudd set such store, Kierkegaard stresses the importance 
of repentance as ‘a quiet daily concern’ (UDVS, 18/SKS 8, 133). This supports the idea that 
self-forgiveness is for him not a one-off - he is sternly critical of ‘momentary repentance’ 
(UDVS, 17/SKS 8, 132) - but rather more like the process we drew on Dillon to describe. He 
insists that one’s guilt should not be totally forgotten. On the contrary, ‘it is a gain to gain 
inwardness to regret the guilt more and more fervently … Of repentance it must be said that, 
if it is forgotten, then its strength was nothing but immaturity, but the longer and more deeply 
it is preserved, the better it becomes. The more closely one views guilt, the more appalling it 
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looks, but repentance is most pleasing to God the farther away on the path of good it catches 
a glimpse of the guilt’ (UDVS, 18-19/SKS 8, 133-4, my emphases).  
If the argument above is sound, then what pleases God is something very different from 
‘wholeheartedness’. 
